Curacao, Day -1 through 1

Day -1:

Got up @ 6 to fly out from Ithaca, to Cities.

Went to SawatDee's with Katie and Shelby. Wonderful food. I had a bed all to myself in the hotel room because Shelby still had to go home to pack (the irony of this is probably lost on you, but it's pretty damn ironic).

Day 0:

Got up @ 3 to fly out from the Cities. Instead of a sensical flight plan, we went to Dallas/Fort Worth before Miami, then Miami to Curacao International. This huge, bearded dude (Scuba Steve) met us at the airport with the coolest Toyota van ever, and we dodged crazy island traffic and stray dogs to arrive at Steve's Wife (Heleen) and his plantation-turned hotel-turned villa. They have two dogs that were doped up because otherwise the fireworks going off would freak them out and they'd wreck a bunch of shit. Had some beer and went to bed.

Day 1:

Woke up @ 6 to the dogs licking my face. We went to the sea aquarium to take the morning class, and I am now on lunch break before our first dive. This place is DAMN sweet.

I will have pictures up soon, I promise.

Additional Notes:

Nat Sherman mints (not "hinta' mints") are great.
Curacao is by far the most beautiful place I've ever been. I'm here for less than 24 hours and already I'm scheming to return.
Flying sucks. It always has, and always will.

Piracy

Four Views of Piracy: A Sociological Examination of 17th and 18th Century Organized Nautical Crime and its Relevance to Contemporary Issues of Deviance

By:
Evan Mowry

For:
Sociology of Deviance: SOC 3141
Inst: Jennifer Rothchild
University of Minnesota: Morris
12/13/05
Introduction
The relevancy of colonial-age piracy to today’s sociological issues is easily questioned; it seems difficult to draw parallels to our lives from fanciful odes to buccaneering like Robert Lewis Stevenson’s Treasure Island, and movies such as Pirates of the Caribbean. However, as with all forms of deviance both contemporary and historical, the underlying causes of piracy extend far beyond characteristics commonly attributed to criminals. Greed, lust, and rejection of social authority are certainly both present in ancient piracy and current deviances, but are those really the factors that determine deviance, especially deviance incorporating violence? In essence, what causes those characteristics and therefore the social structures they encourage? SOC 3141 was given seemingly with the goal of learning to critically analyze information and the past in order to determine, as close as is possible, the truth about commonly distorted concepts of social deviance, their causes, and their cures. The best exercise for this course, therefore, would be to take phenomenon that bear little resemblance on the surface to their contemporary incarnations and describe how they are actually very reminiscent of their contemporaries. This paper takes four different routes in exploring historical piracy; that of Anomie-Strain Theory, Differential Association Theory, Social Control Theory, and Social Conflict Theory, attempting to find connections between the conclusions reached at the end of each route and everyday contemporary phenomenon. In order to analyze piracy and its associated terms, one must first define and describe their historical and empirical qualities.


History and Statistics
The first recorded acts of piracy were around 1400-1300 BC, when Lukka raiders attacked shipping from the coast of Asia Minor. Since then, it has steadily increased in frequency as nautical shipping has become more common, seeing a sharp increase during the 17th and 18th centuries due to the vast riches to be had on shipping lanes from the New World and Europe, and to the geographical nature of the West Indies, which are far remote from the heavily patrolled border-waters of the colonial powers. Pirate careers generally began in one of two ways. Either a merchant ship would be captured by existing pirates and its crew, eager to make up the loss of months of labor, would turn to piracy as a means of subsistence, or naval/civilian mutineers would turn to piracy as one of few choices left after turning on their captain (both civilian and military mutiny was punishable by death, regardless of the circumstances, in many European countries at the time). Military and even civilian recruiting practices were less than humane, and the vast majority of sailors in the British navy had been pressed into service (a policy called impressments) against their will (Percival, The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688).
Spanish galleons carrying gold bullion, French and English shipping transporting slaves from the Ivory Coast of Africa to North and Central America, whalers off the coasts of South, Central, and North America, and colonial ships laden with supplies all provided a rich hunting ground for pirates. Fierce military enforcement of anti-piracy laws during the decades preceding the American Revolution severely decreased the number of pirates operating in the Western Hemisphere, but the coming upheavals of the American and French Revolutions and the Napoleonic Wars provided many new opportunities for pirates.
During these wars, countries hired pirates, giving them a Letter of Marque, which allowed certain immunities from attack if the pirates did not attack their employers’ shipping. Almost all pirates during this time quit piracy for privateering, as you could still plunder most civilian shipping, and it’s likely that they had just neutralized the biggest threat to their business in the area. Later, colonial territories like Canada used privateers almost exclusively in their naval defense, as paying the pirates was much less destructive than not. Most privateering was eradicated with the Declaration of Paris in 1854, which was an attempt at “sanitizing” inter-continental cargo shipping from intervention by other nation states, as other nations would supply Letters of Marque in times of peace with the intent of disrupting their rivals industry. With the advent of steam ships, and later steel and iron hulls and hence technologically superior national navies, and the elimination of privateering from the foreign policies of world powers, piracy and privateering were pretty much eradicated in the Western Hemisphere, but modern forms of piracy flourish to this day.
The ICC reported 93 incidents of nautical theft and 30 instances of murder on the high seas in the first half of 2004 (http://www.icc-ccs.org) alone, although other information seems to indicate this is an optimistically conservative estimate. Recently, pirates based in Somalia chased and fired upon a Seabourne Cruise Ship in an attempt to board it. The International Maritime Bureau chief cited “25 pirate attacks [reported] in the past six months” in the area (http://www.CNN.com, Nov. 12, 2005). Pirate attacks have tripled from 1993-2003, with the first half of 2003 bringing “234 pirate attacks, 16 deaths, and 52 people injured worldwide; there were also 193 crew members held hostage during this period.” (http://www.reference.com) While piracy is no longer the primary fear of marine merchants, it is still prevalent, especially against tourists.
Background/Analysis
Four sociological perspectives of deviance seem relevant to piracy, the first being Anomie-Strain Theory. Anomie-Strain Theory’s basic premise is that social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming conduct (Merton, Readings in Deviant Behavior). But what structures would have encouraged piracy, especially when it was so obviously detested by the governments of the time (evidenced by mandatory death penalties for piracy, entire wings of national navies devoted to the combating of piracy (Karraker, Piracy Was a Business), etc.)? The first requirement to answering this question is to identify the primary social structures of the time, and to identify any conflicts between them that caused potential pirates to interpret their influences in ways neither of those structures intended.
For inhabitants of 16th and 17th century European countries and their colonies, there were two main social influences that ruled their laws, customs, and mores; the Church, and the State. However, frequently individual states’ policies or those of their rulers were at odds with the wishes of the church. The most dramatic example of this would be the creation of the Church of England, by Henry VIII, as an explicit rejection of the Vatican’s monopoly over God (and divorces)(Hooker, WSU). Further, the cited example indicates not only a conflict of authority but of moral direction; frequently, the morals and social beliefs the church preached were at odds with those of European policy-makers and their explicit goals of wealth and power.
Viewed through the lens of Anomie-Strain Theory, the conditions leading to piracy are perceived to be a function of moral confusion among potential pirates. The church was held as an ideological authority and the state a realistic one. When these two authorities both required different behaviors in the same situation, cognitive dissonance occurred, as potential pirates were required (by the state) to behave in morally inappropriate (by the church’s standards) ways, a pressure to engage in what was perceived by them as non-conformist behavior was exerted. Combined with the low value placed on the life of a sailor’s life during this time period, and the strict and predominantly corporal (and frequently capital) discipline common at sea, this pressure resulted in dissatisfied individuals who viewed non-conformist behavior as positive, even necessary. Given this view, one asks less why pirates decided to plunder and more why all of them did not turn to piracy.
The second sociological perspective, Differential Association Theory, maintains that an excess of definitions favorable to deviant behavior over an excess of definitions favorable to non-deviant behavior results in a learned disposition towards deviant behavior, and that these definitions are derived primarily through interactions with intimate, personal groups (Cressey & Sutherland, Readings in Deviant Behavior). Differential Association Theory, then, explains piracy as a learned disposition towards acts of violation and violence against others outside of the intimate group; the intimate group being, in this case, the crew of a naval ship.
While pirates are frequently viewed as brutal and bloodthirsty, they certainly held no monopoly on these characteristics. In fact, many common beliefs about pirates, such as the concept of “walking the plank” were never actually documented. Navies, however, adopted a strategy of extreme violence in their nations’ bids for nautical supremacy. Survivors of military conflicts at sea were hardly ever taken prisoner, as the expense of keeping them on a ship was usually deemed to be too high, and they were commonly marooned on a barren sandbar, thrown overboard, or merely left to their burning, sinking ship. Civilian shipping seldom fared better. Because of the extreme cost of mounting an entrepreneurial voyage overseas, frequently merchants surviving pirate and privateer attacks, and those of an enemy nation’s navy, would limp into port, their hull barren, and their economic prospects bleak. Because of this, defense of valuable cargo was fiercely mounted against both pirate and military raiders, and many would die in the conflict or be reduced to extreme poverty after. In essence, very little concern was shown for any life at all on the high seas by state-sponsored ships.
That emphasis on violent behavior fostered an environment rich in favorable definitions of violent deviance, as crews would be encouraged to rape, murder, and plunder; activities we associate with pirates, while in service on military ships. This kind of encouragement goes far beyond what is today considered acceptable military practice. These attitudes were not confined to the nautical sphere: rape (albeit more acceptable then than now), robbery, and arson were employed against “others” by all the militaries of the time, engendering a popular perspective of delinquency (read: devaiance) in the military, from which the first pirates diverged, and was the source of much of the piracy of that age.
This encouragement wasn’t considered non-deviant behavior, either: the penalties for murder and theft were much more severe during this time period than they are now. The difference lies in the spheres they were engaged in: penalties were only enacted against deviant actors in their own social sphere, and sailors were encouraged to perform acts they themselves considered deviant against members of other social spheres. The situational application of concepts of right and wrong to certain acts twisted sailor’s previously held beliefs that the acts themselves were wrong, and resulted in their belief that they were not.
The third perspective to be used in my sociological analysis of piracy is that of Social Control. Social Control theory holds that individuals, over the course of their socialization and their lives, receive many checks on deviant behavior, and were it not for these checks, there would be a much higher incidence of behaviors considered deviant (for they would not be). Control Theory also holds that deviant acts are always an attempt to obtain socially acceptable goals through socially unacceptable means (Hirschi, Readings in Deviant Behavior). These checks each fall into the categories of commitment, involvement, and belief. The testing of commitment is merely that of a cost/risk analysis: are the rewards of piracy greater than the consequences of being caught? Involvement asks whether the actor is involved enough in socially acceptable endeavors to have no time or resources to commit to socially unacceptable means of fulfillment; essentially, does the actor have time to pillage and plunder? Belief is unlike the other two categories, in that it attempts to separate deviants into two categories, those that reject social mores governing behavior, and those that rationalize deviant behavior within the framework of those mores. Basically, when examining the “belief” of pirates, one must determine if they rejected the social stigma of piracy as immoral, or if they attempted to rationalize piracy as a legitimate means of achieving goals that did not clash with commonly held morals.
Commitment: did pirates view the advantages of piracy as more weighty than the consequences of it? I think the answer is most certainly yes. First of all, for the average sailor, piracy had the operational definition as robbery on the high seas by a ship and crew not of his nationality. The acts were the same, the only difference being the victims. Thus, a switch from legitimate sailing to piracy had all the obvious benefits of naval service with less of the arbitrary, strict discipline and rigid structure. Second, a pirate ship entered into combat only for defense or profit. Naval ships could be ordered into combat for really any reason at all. By removing oneself from naval service, a pirate removed the possibility of apparently senseless risk of his life fighting a foreign warship for little or no personal profit.
It is true, however, that the sacrifices of piracy were great. Becoming a pirate forfeited your life were you captured. A pirate could seldom return home to his family (if he had any). Pirate ships did not have the advantages of ports of call as much as military ships did, and were frequently in disrepair and outgunned by naval vessels. Make no mistake; a pirate certainly chose one sort of risk over another, but at least there was an amount of control, of personal efficacy over the progress of one’s life, something that would be non-existent in naval service, and very rare even as a civilian, and a pirate might end his criminal career at the end of any voyage, whereas very seldom would stock-crew in navies graduate from military serviceman to civilian alive, as the age of discharge was at the tail end of life duration expectancy.
Involvement: were pirates previously involved in socially acceptable means of achieving the common social goals of the day (wealth, power, survival, etc)? The answer would appear to be no, for a number of reasons. First, pirates were hardly ever drawn from the ranks for the privileged elites; the vast majority of pirate crews were poor men who had been poor all their life (Karraker, Piracy Was a Business). The socially acceptable means of pursuing goals in 17th Century Europe were constructed with the primary effect of keeping those who were poor in poverty, and those who were poor in comfort. There were few (and no easy) ways to pursue the goals of wealth and power without resorting to illegal means. Second, due to the incredibly limited amount of social and economic mobility during this time period, pirates generally had very few pathways leading to a guarantee of socially acceptable goals. Finally, as was mentioned in the analyses for Social Differentiation and Anomie-Strain Theory, environments pirates were in before their turn to piracy were especially morally vague. Violence was considered a matter of course by both nautical civilian traders and navies, and without a framework of pacifistic involvement, they had no framework for socially acceptable involvement; because much of a pirate’s life was devoted to theft and violence before becoming a pirate, there were no pacifistic checks on his behavior.
Third, the question of belief: did pirates rationalize their behaviors or reject social norms? The answer to this is not one or the other, but a combination of the two. Pirates rejected the mores of the social sphere, but I don’t believe they actively did so. There was enough violence in their environment before piracy that they felt no need to rationalize their behaviors; they simply viewed them as normal. Also, in the naval socialization process, many pirates were taught to reject their previous social moral structures. By the time many pirates actually became pirates; they had finished with the rejection and were now working on the plundering.
However, the similarities between common versions of the “Pirate Code” and common naval discipline many, a common punishment being “Moses’ Law”, or “40 Stripes, lacking 1”, 40 being the number of whippings believed to be necessary to kill a man, and 39 being as near to death as possible. These similarities were likely due to the severely mortal nature of life at sea, and strict obedience being necessary to safeguard the lives of everyone on board a ship, but the parallels seem to suggest that pirates were merely following what they thought to be a legitimate courses of action within the framework of morals taught by their situation, which would imply an internal, personal rationalization of their deviance.
The fourth and last perspective, Social Conflict Theory, states that crime, as officially determined, is a definition of behavior that is conferred on some people by those in power. Definitions of crime are formulated according to the interests of those who have the power to translate their interests into public policy (Quinney, Readings in Deviant Behavior). Piracy, therefore, was not considered deviant for any reason other than that it negatively effected the rich and powerful.
Pirates primarily paid on shipping, and overseas trading was so expensive that investors were needed to finance capitalistic missions. A single voyage could bankrupt or make hideously wealthy a single person, firm, or family and the people who stood to gain the most from this situation were the already wealthy. Piracy, therefore, only negligibly affected the lower classes, and greatly affected the upper. Because the benefits of shipping were so great to the powerful class, and invasion of that benefit was perpetrated primarily by those outside the nation and the lower classes within the nation, violating that privilege rapidly became a severely taboo act, with the harshest penalties imaginable. Social Control theory states that: “Because it is not the quality of the behavior but the action taken against the behavior that gives it the character of criminality, that which is defined as criminal is relative to the behavior patterns of the class that formulates and applies definitions.”(Quinney, Readings in Deviant Behavior). We see a perfect example of this statement in the utilization of privateers. They were still pursuing acts of piracy, but because the piracy was not perpetrated against the “behavior patterns of the class that formulates and applies definitions”, it was not considered criminal.
Today, the law is slightly different. A radical proponent of Social Control Theory would argue that our perception of piracy has changed only because there is more international cooperation in trade, and that it is not that laws against piracy are Jus Cogens (“compelling law” in Latin, a fundamental principle of international law that is to everyone’s universal benefit) that piracy is labeled a crime against humanity but because it violates the capitalist system that benefits primarily the upper-class of all countries (due to our new, cooperative system of trade) that those practicing it may be tried in any competent court, regardless of nationality.
Conclusion
Piracy bears many resemblances to social problems that plague our contemporary society, just as pirates plagued the shipping lanes of the 17th and 18th century. All four of the analyses undertaken in this paper arrive at the conclusion that different factors converged on sailors to cause them to engage in piracy, all of them out of their reasonable control. That is not to say pirates and modern criminals like them are devoid of any personal responsibility, but that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to give a “fair trial”, in some sense, to those whose lives have been influenced by factors we have not experienced. Basic elements that exposed sailors to the concepts of piracy and positively reinforced those concepts into beliefs are far beyond the grasp of most of us today.
How does this conclusion apply to contemporary issues? First, it causes the realization that crime can be, but seldom is, a personal choice made in a vacuum. People will do what they see as acceptable, learning from others around them. They will refrain from doing that which interferes with socially acceptable habits, but only so far as the perceived benefits of those socially acceptable habits outweigh the costs of deviance, and their perception of the benefits of deviance is only as great as their perceived mistreatment within the current social structure. Any number of current deviance issues such as gangs can be better understood when we view the rise and decline of the Golden Age of piracy in hindsight. Limited social mobility and a sense of deprivation relative to the rest of society are quite obvious contributing factors to many sorts of violent deviance.
Further, by analyzing the impact of moral (and other forms of cognitive) confusion on the circumstances leading to the creation of break-away countercultures and deviant groups we can further understand ourselves, our society, and our history. The Declaration of Independence springs to mind.





References

Myers, Walter Dean. 2001. Amistad: a long road to freedom. New York, N.Y., Puffin Books

Karraker, Cyrus Herrald.1953. Piracy Was a Business. Rindge, N.H., R. R. Smith

Woodbury, George. 1951. The Great Days of Piracy in the West Indies. New York, Norton.

Haring, Clarence Henry. 1966. The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII century. Hamden, CN: Archon Books

Newton, Arthur Percival. 1933. The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688. London, A&C Black, ltd.

Sullivan, Arthur Sir. 1982. Sodomy and the Pirate Tradition: English Sea Rovers in the 17th Century Caribbean. New York, New York University Press.

Turley, Hans. 1956. Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash: Piracy, Sexuality, and Masculine Identity. New York, New York University Press.
Thio, Alex & Thomas C. Calhoun. 2004. Readings in Deviant Behavior. Boston, Pearson Education Inc.
Cressey, Donald R. & Edwin H. Sutherland
Hirschi, Travis
Merton, Robert K.
Quinney, Richard

International Chamber of Commerce; Commercial Crime Services Division (http://www.icc.ccs.org)

CNN (http://www.CNN.com)

Reference.com (http://www.reference.com)

Hooker, Richard: Washington State University (http://www.wsu.edu/~dee)

Progressionism

In this paper, I will attempt to outline a new theory of progress; not a new understanding of the inherent nature of progress, but a theory of its effect upon the world. This perspective, which I will label progressionism, for lack of a more suitable term, views events happening at every level of humans’ lives as primarily motivated by consonant or dissonant concepts of progress. The extent to which we are living with worldview change brought about by the industrial revolution is extensive, and I will examine contemporary conflicts over “progress” and draw parallels between them and turn of the century models of progress. Further, this essay is itself, essentially, an attempt to build upon, extend, and amend former models. The primary empirical focus of this paper is the conflict over Globalization and its familiar concepts: Democracy, Free Trade, etc, and the tactics that have become commonly used to dissuade the proponents of Globalism, namely terrorism.

In order to outline what is an apparently new perspective, clarifications must be made of certain terms that may have become distorted, or distortions must be made of certain accepted terms. For the following pages, please read the following terms not as what you previously thought of them, but what they are defined as here.

Historically, progress has been a rather slippery term, which contributes to its seemingly broad, but actually rather specific definition within progressionism. Progressionism views progress as a concept of the past and present, and more importantly, the future. Furthermore, progress, while being an objective concept as an extant abstract, is a highly subjective perspective when applied to the real world. The best analogy that comes to mind is that of a vehicle; there is one thing a vehicle must do, and that is transport or allow for the transportation of something. However, were one to ask another for an example of a vehicle, responses would vary widely, from something as obvious as an automobile to something as subtle as a road. Within the framework of the above example, and continuing on throughout the paper, “progress” will take the place of vehicle, and “progress ideals” will take the place of the myriad individual responses, such as cars and roads.

Progressionism has a much broader concept of politics than is currently fashionable; it does not limit politics in a society to city councils, or dictators, or international trade agreements. Politics is the everyday interplay of multiple progress ideals, at all levels of human behavior. International trade agreements are certainly political, as are classroom discussions, as are religious gatherings; playground antics as well are political.

Progressionism does not take a positive or negative view of progress, but instead classifies it merely as change that is perceived negatively or positively by different people. Progressive ideals always advocate some level of change in the future. This is not to say that conflict cannot arise from a progressive ideal and traditionalist ideals: people disagree just as much over the benefits or consequences of change as they do what sort of change should happen.

Finally, ideologies are explained by Progressionism as a system of determining a progress ideal. Many factors can influence the formation of a progress ideal, but the one key factor is that of ideology. Basically, ideologies are the composite beliefs an individual or society holds as truth; these societies or individuals interpret current issues in context of these beliefs in order to form a progress ideal. For example, if I believed that the world was flat, God was all-powerful, benevolent, and wise, and that the bible should be taken literally, I might come to the conclusion that the best way for humanity to fulfill its duty would be to multiply and occupy to bursting both the top and bottom of the earth: a round earth concept does not fit my progress ideal, nor does reproductive restraint, and the hypothetical me would resist both those concepts. My future ideal is shaped by my existing beliefs. It should be noted that progress ideals are not static. As ideologies distort, so do idyllic visions of the future.

An argument can be made that those dissonant counter-concepts disagree more with my (hypothetical) basic beliefs than my progress ideal, but then one must answer the question of the reason for beliefs. The most basic beliefs were not formed for any reason at all, but to improve life in the future. Primitive cultures do not promote large families for fun; there are distinct advantages to having many children in a situation with high infant-mortality and difficulty in gathering food. Beliefs (however irrational they may be) almost always have some basis in reality, and are always focused on the avoidance of difficulty or the encouragement of ease in future life, and therefore are the building blocks of a progress idea. Furthermore, identical beliefs can be held my multiple individuals or societies but interpreted differently. A good example of this is the varying level of acceptance of homosexuals among Christians in America.

With all that said, I will now explore the historical basis for our current international situation, and explain why I think terrorism occurs, what it has to do with progress, and how societies’ concepts of progress have changed over the years to serve the needs of those societies.

The two hundred-some year span of the Industrial Revolution has had two main effects. Primarily, it vocalized progress as an objective concept. Individuals during the turn of the century most likely didn’t view it this way, but for an unclear reason: perhaps it was the amount of minds focusing on the future as an attainable goal; perhaps it was the anthropological comparison of “primitive” cultures to those of Europe and the United States, a sense of possible betterment was engendered. For the first time, people began to think about the future as a “better” place than the present. Perhaps individual progress ideals were technological; perhaps social, some were undoubtedly spiritual, but whatever path they took, they all saw the next day, month, year, or century as a potentially better “place” in time than their current state.

Secondly, Colonialism was, in effect, the grandfather of the current state of our world. The domination of resources outside of traditional borders allowed for more colonies, and hence more economic development. This evolved, around the time of the Industrial Revolution, into Imperialism, as influxes of resources graduated from a part of the great game of nation states to the game of nation states due to the polarizing, and admittedly invigorating, effect of industry on governments’ policies. Imperialism is currently manifested as Globalism, which is essentially a reincarnation of Colonialism.

In the period of time since the Industrial Revolution, the United States of America has emerged as the global superpower of the day, much as Britain was 100 years ago. American corporations such as WalMart, as a matter of course, purchase low-cost goods or services from countries with weaker economies-per-capita (WalMart has the dubious distinction of importing 10% of US imports from China in 2002 alone (Charles Phishman, December 2003)), and profit from them by re-selling them in the markets of stronger economies (primarily Europe, the United States, and Canada), with little benefit to China or other comparable countries. Further, Globalism has combined the Colonial ideal of massive influxes of raw or semi-complete material from less-developed nations with classical liberal free-market theory, which has the effect of expanding consumer markets to every locale possible. Companies like WalMart and McDonald’s are no longer “American” companies, in that they sell their product or service to citizens of many nations: McDonald’s website asks visitors to select their “country/market” from a list of 62 nations.

This globalization of trade has the effect of introducing (and in many minds, forcing) Western culture into societies that want little or no part of it. The introduction of American-provided jobs to a developing or third-world nation is often a double-edged sword to indigenous culture and traditions, as the companies do not pay “American” wages (which would almost always be higher) and promote Western free-market ideals, western eating habits, and, most importantly, western progress ideals.

Is this, then, progress? From the perspective of a stereotypical American, of course it is. Globalism means that, in the future, goods will be cheaper, standards of living will be higher, democracy (our championed political system) will engender peaceful resolution of disagreement between nations and ethnic groups previously at odds, and philosophical conclusions that have been accepted by our country such as racial, gender, and economic equality will be accepted by the whole world. After all, once a hungry person discovers a new, good, food source (a fruit, if you will, for dramatic symbolism) isn’t it natural to share that fruit with those they love or depend upon?

Progressionism does not judge these progress ideals. The cynical tone of the previous paragraph was to illustrate that, in keeping with the idea that progress has no absolute positive value, it is simply change. Gender equality in the Middle East would be seen as a welcome change to most Americans, but many, less “advanced” cultures would see it as unnatural. It is in these cultural clashes between American or Western philosophical progress ideals and those of the rest of the world that a new conflict has arisen. Those who disagree with any of these tenants of the American progress ideal will likely fight back in order to maintain their current state or to unseat the future that Globalism has set and replace it with their own, hence, the recent surge in Terrorist activity around the globe. Between 1991 and 2001, “74 terrorist incidents were recorded in the united states. During this same time frame, an additional 62 terrorist acts being plotted…were prevented…For every successful terrorist attack mounted in the United States, [19.83] anti-US attacks are carried out around the world.” (FBI Publication #0308) 254 of the terrorist attacks in 2000-2001 were directed towards business interests, dwarfing the next largest category (US government interests) which weighs in at 106 (FBI Publication #0308). Further evidence of an upswing of terrorist activity (or an upswing in extremist tactics) is evidenced by chart #1.

The US Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan describes the “problem” of Globalization thusly “Millions of the world’s poor, however, have not yet benefited from globalization, increasing their risk of alienation. Furthermore, transnational threats have emerged from globalization, enabling the creation of deadly global terror networks, spurring crime that reaches beyond borders, and spreading disease via the most mobile population in history.”(US Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan) Eight of the thirteen bullet points in this document are clearly expressed desires to foster American-style government and/or US-beneficial structure to foreign countries and/or regions. Mark Hertsgaard remarked in his 2002 book The Eagle’s Shadow that the most striking thing about America’s reputation overseas is that it is mixed. Foreigners both admire America’s democratic process, wealth, and freedoms while at the same time detesting its military, economic, and diplomatic policies, which are seen as forcibly pressed upon others. Freedom and the arrogance that is associated with it are the two most common characteristics attributed to Americans.

The American progress ideal is blatantly obvious: Globalization. It views Globalism as an idyllic future, with recognition of “the profound need for democracy and market economies to meet the aspirations of a new generation” (US Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan) in the Middle East. Objectively, one must wonder whose generation’s aspirations will be met, the Arabs or the Westerners? However, the very concepts that the United States claims to be defending and encouraging: stability and freedom, are also championed by the terrorists, who view themselves as the oppressed (by America and Israel’s military, and Western economic models) rather than the (religious, gender) oppressors that Americans commonly think of them as. It is not that the methods Western states use to influence other cultures, although those do stir up quite a lot of dissent on their own: it is their view of the future that is not compatible with the Islamic future. Muslim progress ideals typically stress a united Islam and the eradication of Israeli colonial brutality, whereas American progress ideals typically denounce (at least non-Christian) religion as a political rallying point and assert Israel’s right to exist, as well as its right to use ethically questionable means for national defense. These two scenarios cannot both simultaneously come to pass, and so are fundamentally at odds.

Progressionism attempts to explain the wherefore of these “transnational threats” in context of Globalization by seeking the root conflict. While there are many different terrorist groups acting against the United States, and as many espoused reasons for their existence, the underlying structure of the equations is that of discordant counterpoint. Much as in music, when two notes do not match on some scale, they sound poor together, and the audience winces: there is psychological stress at hearing two sounds that do not blend well. If people have a noticeable negative reaction to sound, they can hardly be expected to do nothing when they perceive their culture, way of life, and societal institutions assaulted. This is an odd analogy, but terrorism reminds me of a scene in the movie Red Dragon, about the serial killer Hannibal Lecter. Lecter is a fan of orchestral music, and when one violinist repeatedly falls below his expectations, he kills him.

Fictional evidence aside, there is strong evidence (and logic) in favor of violent means of political expression in this context and many others. The “millions of the world’s [alienated from the United States] poor” have very few avenues of political expression open to them. It is very difficult for the average American to perceive the jamb into which the impoverished of this world have been placed. Americans vote for what they want, and because we’re the current world superpower, it will happen. It is hard to for us to understand that in most other countries domestic issues are heavily affected by what other countries do, because Americans are so used to being the effecter, not the effected. Another problem with non-violent action against the established neo-colonial system is that little care is voiced by the people of powerful nations for those in impoverished ones. There is no neo-noblesse oblige to run counterpoint to neo-colonialism. In a situation where pacifistic efforts go unnoticed, the logical conclusion is to turn to violence.

So, two major world cultures are currently clashing, and one is not being heard in the debate over whether one should win, neither should win, or both cultures should be synthesized. To be heard, political actors think, they must first be noticed. And the only significant tool they have to illuminate their concerns is our fear. If Americans will not cave to chanted dissent or burned effigies, it is worth it to the actors to attempt violence, because their progress ideals are at risk of being lost to Western influence.

While this theory o’ mine is aimed at directly applying to contemporary international issues, it is applicable elsewhere in time. Throughout history, different manifestations of progress have been both accepted and rejected, many at the same time. Sometimes, the process of acceptance results in a synthesis of old and new values into a composite ideology that dominates a culture. A good example of this would be the arrival of Spanish Catholic missionaries in South and Central America who later went on to lead their congregations against oppressive power structures similar to those they had supported in the past or Christian culture itself, retaining pagan elements of Easter and Christmas, and integrating them into the new religion. However, violence surrounding a clash of progress ideals is not unique to the 20th- and 21st centuries by any means. Both Luddism and Manifest Destiny were two phenomenons that support the hypothesis that violent political action has historically been a direct function of progressive conflict

As early as the 1600s drastic improvements were being made on common household machines like looms, and prompting an increase in production and an easing of poverty. However, more and more workers were hired to work at someone else’s machine, instead of using their own. This exploitation was the newest form of capitalism, and drew increasing criticism from both the lower and, to a much lesser extent, upper classes. Lord Byron famously supported the Luddite movement, and argued against parliamentary resolutions against their actions.

The term “Luddism” grows from an urban myth of England; that in 1779 a man named Ned Lud broke into a house and destroyed two stocking frames. People who identified with the insane man, having presumably lost their jobs or seen their livelihoods threatened by the capitalization of low-scale industry, took on his moniker and began mimicking his actions. Industrial sabotage of this sort had been going on since 1710, but it erupted in 1811 with the formation of a radical militia of Luddites, parallel to today’s American Patriots movement in scale and purpose. Skirmishes between the British Army and the Luddite forces resulted in the death penalty being enacted for any acts of “machine breaking”, or industrial sabotage, in an effort to curb the violence and to appease the merchants whose capital was being vandalized.

The Luddite movement was “eyes wide open class warfare” (Pynchon). It is a perfect example of Marxist theory’s class warfare, the start of a socialist revolution, in a sense. The theory of relative deprivation fits the Luddite movement very well, when combined with Marx and Engel’s treatises. Relative deprivation, basically, states that when people expect X, and they receive Y, and Y is less than X, then there will be unrest of a sort. Lordy Byron’s rejection of the Frame Breaking Act of 1812 was based not on any anti-capitalism leanings, nor any fear of technology as humanity’s downfall, but because the drastic increase on the price of wheat was combining with high unemployment (perceived as an effect of the hiring of low-wage apprentices to work simple machines) to increase poverty to unbearable levels for the lower class. He wrote in 1812:

“Some folks for certain have thought it was shocking,
When Famine appeals, and when Poverty groans,
That life should be valued at less than a stocking,
And breaking of frames lead to breaking of bones.
If it should prove so, I trust, by this token,
(And who will refuse to partake in the hope?)
That the frames of the fools may be first to be broken,
Who, when asked for a remedy, sent down a rope.”
(Byron)

The Industrial Revolution, when devoid of its proud title of “Progress”, had the following effects: pollution, extreme class disparity, unemployment, and direct contribution to much larger, more directly lethal events (the World Wars spring to mind). All of these effects overwhelmingly negatively impacted the lower-classes far more than they did the upper. Luddism was merely a lower-class rejection of an upper-class value and the consequent clash over dominance, at which the upper-class eventually won out.

The concept of Manifest Destiny, later viewed as greedy and capitalistic, and closely tied with the gold rushes of the 1860s and 1870s, was first optimistically conceived in an 1845 piece by John L. O’Sullivan. He wrote:

".... the right of our manifest destiny to over spread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federaltive development of self government entrusted to us. It is right such as that of the tree to the space of air and the earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny of growth." (Brinkley, 1)

As in the above quote, it was first perceived as a philosophically and religiously reasoned right to further the growth (a good thing) of America (a good thing, so, a good thing ²). This feeling, when fueled by the discovery of gold in the Oregon Territory, brought about a direct conflict of interest between the American government and People and that of the Native Americans. The influx of settlers began to wear on the Native’s land and resources, and the formation of the Transcontinental Railroad, begun in 1863 (PBS, 1), prompted the US Government to displace thousands of Natives and enstated precedence that allowed for the slaughter of entire Native American communities with little or no provocation. From this dichotomy the title of my essay arises. Between Brinkley’s concept that envisions a free, inclusive, and benevolent nation and the nation that is evidenced from events such as the Trail of Tears or the Sand Creek Massacre there is a terrible schism. The public’s synthesis of Brinkley’s progress accepted the destiny to spread and possess, and rejected that of liberty, instead maintaining the old standbys of violence and oppression to further the new concept of progress.

This observation is interesting also, because it illustrates a key point: multiple progress ideals can impact each other at the same philosophical point, and the resulting vector will likely bear evidence of all their influences. In the example of Manifest Destiny, the American public contested Brinkley’s progress ideal, and quickly usurped it and added elements of it to their own. In addition, the Native American progress ideal and that of the American Government did not contest each other for long, with the indigenous future quickly and brutally being overrun by American dreams of greatness and wealth.

If one accepts that progress is subjective, and that political action is motivated by an individual’s concept of progress and an idyllic future, then progress becomes the common denominator of conflict of all sorts and levels. Violent, pacifistic, emotional…it is our normative vision of what the future should be shaped by inherited or derived beliefs about the true nature of the world we live in that determines any and all of our actions. If situations offer individuals only certain paths, and the vision of what should be does not fit those paths, there will be strife. Terrorism and other forms of political violence are not the result of madmen, or murderers, or those who “hate freedom”. They are the result of a world-state that cripples their ability to determine their own present and future. By refusing to concede that progress is subjective, and that individuals who do not share our basic beliefs cannot hope to share our utopian ideals, Western Society is damning itself to a world where it is the bully that does not know when to stop teasing, and to a population that increasingly find their only recourse is that which we find most abhorrent.

Oh...oh my. That was good.

Fucking Awesome.

It's pretty late on a sunday, and I just finished a long-ass Sociology of Deviance paper.

I'd really like to apolgoize for not having updated in a long time, and also for not really updating right now. Here's a quick, boring, uninspir(ed/ing) list of what's gone/going on/going to go on.

Curacao over winter break.
Sleeping like a wee babe tonight.
Bent outta shape over things I really should have left behind a long time ago.
I have books to send, and a person to send them to, but I have no location to send them to.
The stars have been beautiful, as have the geese.
I'm all-around irritated with people here in Morris. Only a few of them are as cool as I remembered them being from last week.
Magic is interesting again.
Computer coming soon, as I finally got the loan stuff straightened out.
I have black lights in my room.
I won't be home until like January 12th or so. How fucking crazy is that.
I might be bouncing on Water St. this summer. How fucking crazy is that.
I'm passing both French and Statistics this year. How fucking crazy is that.

SO: I love you, but I'm uninspired to express it. Good night.